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Abstract—Closed loop control systems have been implemen-
ted to conduct a variety of tasks (e.g. manufacturing and
automation). Industrial Control System (ICS) have been used
to regulate a closed loop process; however, ICS are exposed
to the same security vulnerabilities associated with enterprise
networks. Cryptography has been deployed to overcome the
associated data communication weaknesses between each ICS
node through the use of block ciphers; however, the drawback
of applying cryptographic algorithms to ICS is the additional
communication latency. This paper investigates the relationship
between security constructs and latency for closed loop control
system with test conducted in a simulated environment. A case
scenario is illustrated to demonstrate the impact of the results
obtained to a real world context.
Index Terms—closed loop control, real-time systems, compu-
tational constraints, security constructs
I. INTRODUCTION
Closed loop control systems are implemented in a variety
of sectors to provide feedback from a set process. With closed
loop control providing autonomous actions based on feedback
from an actuator, this method is suitable for monitoring a
continuous process without human intervention. Closed loop
control has commonly been identified in Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) (e.g. computer aided manufacturing). With
devices becoming interconnected, one of the most challenging
aspects of ICS is the exposed security vulnerabilities, this is
due to the increase of cyber crime and availability of open
designs [1].
Increased threats to ICS are also becoming more frequent
[2] with statistics reported indicating that cyber attacks against
control systems has increased. The System Administration
Networking and Security Institute (SANS) survey indicates
a minimum of one or two security breaches against ICS
has occurred within the past twelve months [3]. Safety of
industrial networks is critical as undetected corruption of data
packets during transmission can cause damage to equipment,
environment and human health [4]. This paper investigates
how software based security algorithms using block ciphers
impact the overall communication latency of closed loop
control systems. A mathematical model is proposed to aid
practitioners to predict the effects of security constructs on
closed loop control systems without the requirement and cost
of implementing an experimentation platform.
The structure of this paper is organised as follows: Section
II introduces the terms and phrases discussed in this paper.
Section III discusses a system safety case scenario with
Section IV reviewing relevant literature. Section V discusses
the experimentation procedure with Section VI analysing the
results obtained. Section VII introduces the proposed math-
ematical mode with Section VIII conducting a comparative
experiment of the proposed mathematical model against the
simulation. Section IX examines the mathematical model as a
predictive tool. Section X discusses the impact of the results
to the context of the case scenario. Section XI concludes.
II. PRELIMINARY
This section defines the terms used throughout this paper.
• Real-Time Constraints: is a computing system whose
correct behaviour depends not only on the value of the
computation but also on the time at which outputs are
produced.
• Non Real-Time Constraints: is a computing system
whose correct behaviour depends only on the value of
the computation.
• Latency: The duration taken for data to travel from
transmitter to receiver.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality in this paper refers to
using encipherment methods in order to thwart an
unauthorised entity understanding the content of the
payload of the data frames transmitted.
• Integrity: In this paper integrity is determining whether
data has been altered in transit at the receiving node.
• Authentication: The proof that a device on the network is
legitimately eligible to communicate with other eligible
devices on the same network.
• AEAD concept: The Authenticated Encryption with As-
sociated Data (AEAD) concept provides both confiden-
tiality and integrity security data services to transmitted
packetised data.
III. SYSTEM SAFETY CASE SCENARIO
The following section considers a scenario where a closed
loop control system is used to automate a safety critical
process. Dust explosions in bulk solids powder handling can
result in personal injury or death and loss of plant. The
adoption of legislation to mitigate the effects of such events
is now widespread and many technical approaches can be
applied to ensure plant safety. The scenario uses a suite of
these counter-measures commonly found in industry. Figure
1 illustrates, the main components found in many plants (i.e.
air mover, powder feeder, pneumatic conveying pipeline and
reception vessel).
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Figure 1. Schematic of a process plant for bulk solids powder handling
Best practice dictates that in the event of a rapid pressure
rise being detected (i.e. the initiation of a dust explosion) a
range of counter-measures should be activated. The energy
released during a dust explosion is such that an over-pressure
capable of destroying the plant can develop on average within
a tenth of a second (e.g. polyester can attain a maximum
explosion pressure of 6.1 bar at a rate of 85 bar/sec) [5]
thus the response time for detection and actuation of counter-
measures is a critical factor for the safety of staff and the safe
operation of the plant.
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW
Section IV introduces literature relevant to the context
of this paper with focus on confidentiality, integrity and
authentication in closed loop control and methods of
modelling utilised. The literature review is sectioned into
three parts; firstly the current approaches undertaken by other
researchers, secondly the introduction of the AEAD constructs
and finally a conclusion of the literature undertaken. Ma et
al focus on mechanisms for providing security to real-time
systems; the authors propose the Adaptive Risk Control
and Security Management concept (ARCSM) [6]. This
approach targets current security vulnerabilities for insecure
environments without compromising the real-time element
of embedded systems. This is achieved by using a two tier
feedback control framework on each node on the network.
Experimentation conducted by the authors examine the time
and energy required by cryptographic constructs and how
this influences the operation of the embedded system. The
results obtained from their research show that the ARCSM
approach is better suited for open loop control with varying
run-time performance; however, the security constructs tested
in this paper only utilises legacy security constructs, raising
questions to how contemporary cryptographic constructs
would behave in this context. It is also noted that a high end
specification ARM S3C2440 microprocessor was selected for
experimentation.
A method to overcoming deception attacks in closed
loop control systems is presented by Pang et al using their
secure networked predictive control system (SNPCS) [7]. The
research conducted by the authors provides confidentiality,
integrity and authentication to data by using a software
implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES),
Message Digest version 5 (MD5) and a time-stamp. The
Recursive Networked Predictive Control (RNPC) is utilised
to compensate for the control system performance from
the deception attacks. Experimentation was performed
on an internet based control rig with results showing
the implemented countermeasure was suitable; however,
it is unknown whether this security approach is suited
against other attacks vectors. The comparison between the
authors method and other software security constructs is not
explicitly explained. The implementation of a time-stamped
authentication system is also a security vulnerability due
to synchronisation of two time zones. An attacker could
craft their own packet using the same time-stamp and spoof
a legitimate device with the possibility of the packet still
passing the authentication procedure.
Gupta et al [8] assesses the performance of data and time
sensitive wireless network control systems with the presence
of information security. The issues examined by the authors
emphasise the security vulnerability of wireless broadcast
to transmit data over the internet from the Network Control
System (NCS) as the broadcast signal can be detected by
anyone within range. This is further exposed as NCS had
been designed without consideration of security in mind,
allowing for the attacker to compensate the device remotely.
A proposed solution by the authors uses security constructs
DES and Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) operating
in the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode on a closed loop
control testbed intelligent space (ispace). Results obtained
suggest that the security constructs investigated have a slight
impact on the timing of the closed loop control system with
overhead of 9% to 18%. The focus of the research conducted
by the au tours is for securing NCS traffic over the internet.
The security constructs used are no longer standardised due
to their known security vulnerabilities and the ECB mode of
operation is also susceptible to known plain text attacks.
An approach undertaken by Dhand et al [9] examines
the impact of communication delay on real-time distributed
control systems. Current problems discussed by the authors
focuses on the challenge of minimising delay within a
control loop and how time delays are not always specific to
the controller alone but also from transmission and sensor
delays. The solution presented in this literature uses the Auto-
regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) to forecast
the communication delay a control loop. Experimentation
was performed using the national instruments Data Socket
Transport Protocol (DSTP) at the application layer, the
Transmission Communication Protocol (TCP) for the
transport layer and Ethernet for the data link layer. Results
had been acquired by using minilab 15 and Simulink. The
impact of security constructs on the operation of real-time
control networks has been overlooked as the focus of the
model is for communication latency.
This paragraph introduces the AEAD concepts with two
paradigms being presented; the fixed standardised approach
of Counter with cipher block chaining (CCM) and the
adjustable and flexible approach of TinyAEAD. CCM is
a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
standardised AEAD construct designed to provide integrity
and confidentiality using a 128-bit block cipher [10]. The
TinyAEAD construct is designed to provide confidentiality
and integrity services using block ciphers of varying bit
length [11]. This construct can be configured to run at a
reduced specified number of block cipher iterations in order
to enhance the processing speed of the construct. In addition
TinyAEAD provides flexibility and adaptability that can be
applied to a broad range of contexts.
Concluding from the literature review undertaken two areas
have been identified as areas to conduct further research;
firstly the requirement for test with modernised cryptographic
constructs is required as the literature uses constructs that
are no longer standardised. Secondly a mathematical model
is required to predict and disclose the impact of security
constructs on closed loop control systems as current models
do not take this into consideration.
V. EXPERIMENTATION PROCEDURE
Section V discusses the experimentation procedure
conducted and the apparatus selected. The simulation
programme used is Proteus ISIS 8 professional with the
Microchip PIC18F45K22 selected as the microcontroller of
choice. The Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) has been selected
as the physical medium used to transport the data between
microcontrollers. Software security constructs evaluated in
this paper focus on variation of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) using a 128-bit key. Modes of operation
examined were CCM and TinyAEAD. The selected closed
loop control approach used is the Proportional-Integral-
Derivative (PID).
The experimentation examines latency for a transmitting
microcontroller to process and transmit the packet, the
duration of the packet to propagate to the receiving
microcontroller to process the received packet and perform
the feedback action. The metric utilised for measuring the
impact software security constructs on latency is measured
in milliseconds. All timings are taken from the simulator used.
Packet sizes of 36, 52 and 84 bytes in length were sampled
to mimic ICS protocols with SPI divisor of 4 to output the
data at the fastest configuration setting. The crystal frequency
sampled was 8 MHz to replicate a low frequency micro-
controller. Finally it is assumed for this test scenario that
the communication medium used to transmit between the
microcontrollers uses copper cabling of 100m in length.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTATION
This section analyses the data obtained from undertaking
the experimentation procedure. Table I illustrates the latency
for varying packet sizes using an SPI divisor of 4 without
security constructs applied. Table I is used as a benchmark
as the real-time operation of a closed loop control network
without security.
Table I
TOTAL SIMULATED COMMUNICATION LATENCY FOR A SIMULATED SINGLE
HOP CLOSED LOOP FEEDBACK LINK WITHOUT SECURITY
PACKET SIZE
(BYTES)
TIME
(ms)
36 BYTES 180.4
52 BYTES 180.7
84 BYTES 181.7
Data in Figure 2 presents the communication latency gener-
ated by software security constructs for a 36 byte packet. The
zero on the x-axis reflects the time recorded for no security
for a 36 byte packet. It is inferred that the communication
latency has increased with longer latency recorded for CCM
and TinyAEAD at ten rounds, whilst TinyAEAD at five and
three rounds had the smallest impact. TinyAEAD had the least
latency overhead of 12% whilst CCM incurred an overhead of
29%.
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Figure 2. Simulated communication latency for a simulated single hop closed
loop feedback link with security (36 byte packet length)
Figure 3 graphs the results using a packet size of 52 bytes.
The security constructs examined have shown an increased
in the total communication latency with noticeable difference
between TinyAEAD at three rounds and CCM. TinyAEAD at
3 rounds incurred the smallest latency overhead of 25% with
CCM incurring the biggest latency overhead of 37%.
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Figure 3. Simulated communication latency for a simulated single hop closed
loop feedback link with security (52 byte packet length)
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of software security
constructs using an 84 byte packet size. The graphs indicates
that CCM and TinyAEAD both running at ten rounds has the
biggest increase in the communication latency. TinyAEAD
using three rounds has the least communication latency. Tiny
AEAD at three rounds has the smallest impact on latency
overhead with 33% increase, whilst CCM had the biggest
impact on latency with 48% increase.
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Figure 4. Simulated communication latency for a simulated single hop closed
loop feedback link with security (84 byte packet length)
Analysing the results obtained from the experimentation
adjustable cryptographic constructs are better suited to min-
imising communication latency in comparison to standardised
constructs. Packet size also influences the latency generated
with the smaller packet sizes processed faster than larger sized
packet.
VII. PROPOSED COMMUNICATION LATENCY MODEL
This section introduces the proposed mathematical model
to calculate latency introduced by security constructs on
communication link of closed loop control. The model is
designed to take into consideration factors influencing the
overall latency of the system whilst allowing for flexibility
for the parameters used; making it advantageous as it can
calculate latency for a closed loop control system.
τ l = (4 (η + δ + ψ)) + ν
`
+z (1)
Formula 1: Calculating communication latency introduced by
security constructs for a single hop closed loop control
The total latency is represented as (τ l) with the instruction
cycle time (at a specified clock frequency) is (δ). The trans-
mission time of the data is represented as (η) and the time to
process a byte of data though the security algorithm is (ψ).
The size of the packet is (4) with the propagation delay (e.g.
the speed of electrons through a copper cable or the vacuum
of the speed of light) represented as (ν). The distance of the
link in meters is (`). The round trip time is (z).
VIII. COMPARISON BETWEEN PROPOSED MODEL AND
SIMULATION RESULTS
Utilising the proposed model presented in Formula 1; Table
II compares the results obtained from the proposed model
against the simulated results. The results take into considera-
tion the latency incurred from the software security construct
TinyAEAD at three rounds. A crystal frequency of 8 MHz
was sampled. SPI divisors of 4 sampled with packet sizes of
36, 52 and 84 bytes examined.
Table II
MODEL VERSUS SIMULATION RESULTS FOR VARYING PACKET SIZES
PACKET SIZE
(BYTES)
PROPOSED
MODEL
RESULTS
(ms)
SIMULATED
RESULTS
(ms)
DIFFERENCE
IN RESULTS
(%)
36 202.3 201.5 0.39
52 213.6 212.5 0.51
84 236 234.1 0.80
Data displayed in Table II compares the outcome achieved
from the proposed mathematical model and the simulated
tests. Results indicate calculated and recorded results correlate.
Comparison of the proposed mathematical model and the
simulation results indicate that the results calculated from
the model is within an average percentage of 0.56%. This
infers that the model is a good predictor for calculating
the communication latency for closed loop control with the
inclusion of AEAD security constructs.
Summary of the experimentation conducted indicates that
a range of factors influence the communication latency gen-
erated. Packet size contributes the total latency with results
indicating the larger sized packets have the biggest increase
in latency in comparison to smaller packets. This indicates
that protocols with larger payloads may not be best suited
to meeting the real-time requirements of closed loop control
systems.
IX. PREDICTIVE MODELLING
This section uses the proposed model as a predictive
tool against the results obtained from the simulation. The
PIC18F45K22 microcontroller can use a maximum crystal fre-
quency of 64 MHz [12] and the communication latency can be
calculated by using the proposed model. The crystal frequency
and packet size sampled has strong correlation with the latency
output. To validate this hypothesis a contrived scenario has
been derived with a PIC18F45K22 microcontroller operating
at a crystal frequency of 32 MHz. TinyAEAD at three rounds
has been selected as the security construct of choice as it better
suited to meeting real-time constraints. Three packet sizes are
selected for this test, being 36, 52 and 84 bytes in length. The
SPI divisor has been set to 4. σ represents standard deviation
in Table III.
Table III
COMPARATIVE RESULTS OF MODEL VERSUS SIMULATION FOR SOFTWARE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TINYAEAD (3 ROUNDS)
PACKET
SIZE
(BYTES)
PROPOSED
MODEL
RESULTS
(ms)
SIMULATED
RESULTS
(ms)
DIFFERENCE
IN RESULTS
(%)
MEAN
(ms)
σ
36 49.9 50.4 0.97 50.1 0.35
52 51.5 53.1 1.13 52.3 1.13
84 53.4 58.5 5.11 57.1 1.90
From the data obtained in Table III, the model is better
suited for predicting the latency for small packet sizes, whilst
larger packet sizes show an increased percentage difference
between the proposed result and the simulated result. Utilising
the specified crystal frequency for this scenario suggests that
the real-time constraints in Table I would be meet. It is also
inferred that the model is suited to predicting the latency
incurred utilising different crystal frequencies.
X. DISCUSSION
Section X examines the potential impact of applying
security constructs to the system case scenario presented in
Section III. The real-time requirement for this scenario is
25 milliseconds [13] before the pressure begins to incline,
therefore this value is used to mimic a real world scenario.
The results obtained in Section IX suggest that a 32 MHz
crystal frequency was not suitable for meeting the real-time
requirements for this context; however, for this case scenario
the maximum crystal frequency of 64 MHz has been selected
for the PIC18F45K22. A direct comparison between AEAD
constructs CCM at ten rounds and TinyAEAD at three rounds
were selected with packet sizes samples of 36, 52 and 84
bytes in size selected measure the effect of changing the
crystal frequency.
Figure 5 results indicates that the selection of the most
suitable security construct is required to meet the real-time
requirements of a system with TinyAEAD impacting less on
the latency in comparison to CCM.
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Figure 5. Model versus simulation of security construct impact for case
scenario
Data illustrated in Figure 5 suggests that TinyAEAD would
meet the real-time constraints using a packet size of 36 byte
length only. The results obtained from the mathematical
model correlate with the simulation, inferring that this model
is applicable for predictive impacts.
As discussed throughout this paper the addition of secur-
ity constructs on closed loop control increases the latency
incurred. A result of missing the real-time constraints could
impact on safety and operation of the staff and the plant. Figure
6 shows a consequence of compromising plant safety as shown
in the DeBruce Grain Co incident in Haysville, Kansas.
Figure 6. DeBruce Grain Co dust explosion incident [14]
XI. CONCLUSION
The proposed mathematical model presented in this paper
is suitable for calculating the impact of security constructs
for varying packet lengths and security constructs. Due to
the flexibility of the model users can predict the impact
of communication latency with the addition of security
constructs applied without having to invest in a simulator or
real world closed loop control system.
Concluding from the data obtained the impact of security
constructs on closed loop control systems is significant
with the overall communication latency increasing. The
consequence of inducing delay on a real-time closed loop
control system can be catastrophic as presented in the case
scenario and therefore raises further questions regarding
systems safety.
Consideration of the security construct is crucial towards
the latency generated as the incorrect selection can cause a
bigger impact on latency, causing disruption to the operation
of the system and potential safety implications.
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